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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes our conceptualization of complexity in Large Infrastructure Projects (LIPs). 
Since complexity itself is an emergent concept that is hard to pin down, we focus on the 
relationship between various project features and, particularly, properties associated with 
complexity such as difficulty, outcome variability and non-linearity, and (non) governability. We 
propose a combined structural and process-based theoretical framework for understanding 
contributors to complexity in this particular substantive context – the “House of Project 
Complexity” (HoPC). The HoPC addresses the impact of inherent technical and institutional 
project features, the process of project architecting, the structural relationship between various 
project features and these “designed” constructs, and the emergence of risks and life-cycle 
properties (‘ilities’). The HoPC is first applied to two trial samples and then to the main data set 
of detailed case studies of infrastructure projects prepared for the IMEC study.4 We believe that 
the “House of Project Complexity” can be generally extended to other substantive contexts that 
exhibit similar properties as Large Infrastructure Projects (LIPs), in the extractive industries, 
large manufacturing projects, or other industrial megaprojects. 
KEYWORDS: projects, complexity, infrastructure, project architecture, project shaping, risks 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent work in the area of complexity theory in relation to large engineering projects has 
made advances by analytically breaking down the core concept of “complexity” into more 
specific concepts. While both academics and practitioners have long possessed an intuition for 
the significance of complexity and its relationship with performance in complex sociotechnical 
systems, coping with or accommodating complexity still remains challenging. Current efforts in 
the field are focused on producing integrative frameworks that shed light not only on the 
structural nature of complexity but also on the process by which complexity can be actively 
managed. There is a clear need for a succinct representation of the concepts under the broader 
umbrella of complexity. Our proposed framework refines and builds on recent contributions and 
sheds light not only on the structural concepts that can be used to unpack complexity, but also 
the process by which key players in projects shape this structure to create favorable emergent 
behavior. The juxtaposition between static structural aspects of complexity and the dynamic 
envelope of project uncertainties is of particular interest. We believe that both need to be 
reconciled in any theoretical framework. 
A main contribution of our work is the conceptual distinction between project features 
that are inherent to project opportunities (inherent features), those that are conditional on the 
selection of a project concept including its governance structure and execution process 
(architectural features), and those that arise from the interaction of these two sets of features as 
the project is shaped and managed over time (emergent features). We then relate these to various 
the high-level project outcomes and emergent properties of the LIP – the “ilities.” A second 
contribution is to separate the inherent features into technical and institutional domains and to 
develop these two in a parallel fashion A third contribution is to connect complexity with the 
concept of project architecting, developed initially in Miller and Lessard (2001) and extended in 
Lessard and Miller (2012). Project architecting subsumes two process-based lenses, almost 
always treated separately – project shaping, and systems design and engineering. Project 
architecting is developed here as a process of “dual domain” design – the active and intentional 
shaping of technical and institutional project features to result in desirable functional properties. 
We use the HoPC framework to classify LIPs based on a project’s degree of complexity 
in both the technical and the institutional domains, and to test whether this typology helps 
explain variation in project performance.  This typology also should be useful in benchmarking 
of project management choices such as pacing, resourcing, and FEL and relating them to 
performance. Finally, it should enable organizations managing numerous projects to better 
rationalize the allocation of resources and the attention given to specific aspects of project 
governance. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ON PROJECT COMPLEXITY AND BASIC 
PROPOSITION 
While the concept of complexity is not new in the literature on projects and engineered 
systems, many have offered varying frameworks for understanding complexity in large 
engineered projects, of which large infrastructure projects are a subset. As the discussion below 
shows, the frameworks have matured to an extent where complexity is recognized as a broader 
 4 
 
 
umbrella concept, and recent literature has mainly argued for what additional sub-concepts 
should be included, the relationships between those sub concepts and how they could be applied 
in a practical sense. Most proposals for application exhibit contingency-based approaches 
(following Shenhar (2001) and Burton & Obel (2004)), however new literature argues that 
institution-based approaches should also be used to study projects (W. R. Scott, 2012). We trace 
the evolution of the concept of complexity in projects here. 
One of the first attempts to pin down the concept of complexity in projects was made by 
Baccarini (1996), who highlighted the difficulty faced by project managers in coping with 
complexity in construction projects. He took as a given the notion that large projects in general, 
and construction projects per se, are invariably complex and that projects had increased in 
complexity since WWII. Baccarini (1996) proposed that project complexity could be defined as 
‘consisting of many varied interrelated parts, and operationalized in terms of differentiation and 
interdependency.’ He also put forward the notion of types of complexity and operationalized 
both differentiation and interdependency in the technical and organizational domains, to 
emphasize how complexity in those two domains differs in nature and manifestation (Baccarini, 
1996).   
Much of early definition of project complexity was structural, focusing on concepts of 
number (tasks, technical specialties, departmental units, groups, components), hierarchy (levels 
or depth – of an organization or technical process), and connectivity (pooled, sequential, or 
reciprocal). This conceptualization of project complexity tied many previously separate threads 
in the literature in system sciences, organizational theory and project management (Dewar & 
Hage, 1978; Hall, 1987; Klir, 1985; E. J. Miller, 1959; Mintzberg, 1979). The concepts of project 
size and uncertainty were identified as separate from project complexity in the early definition, 
but as the discussion below shows, the concept of complexity was quickly refined to include 
discussion of both size and uncertainty.  
Williams later suggested that the idea of ‘structural complexity’ should be fixed as a 
distinguishing concept from ‘complexity’ in general – reserving the latter as a broader umbrella 
term (T. M. Williams, 1999). He offered that, to the extent a project involves the design and 
delivery of complex product, it is the product’s (structural) complexity that drives the project’s 
(structural) complexity. While this framing reinforced the importance of structure in both the 
technical and organizational domains of the ‘project’, it further highlighted the nature of 
interdependencies in both domains, especially in terms of sequential relationships and reciprocal 
feedbacks (Thompson, 1967). Whereas both sequentiality (one element’s output is another’s 
input) and reciprocity (each element’s output are others’ inputs) were found to significantly 
affect project outcomes in studies he was involved with, Williams (1999) suggested that 
reciprocity particularly intensified complexity (Ackermann, Eden, & Williams, 1997; T. 
Williams, Eden, Ackermann, & Tait, 1995). The increase in the use of concurrent engineering 
practices (Lawson & Karandikar, 1994; Prasad, 1996) was identified as a possible causal factor 
driving the increase in reciprocity and therefore the structural complexity of projects. Structural 
complexity was thus articulated to be a concept category under the broader umbrella concept of 
overall ‘project complexity’. 
In roughly parallel work, others discussed the relevance of the concept of uncertainty for 
the management of complex projects. Notable among these are Shenhar & Dvir (1996), Williams 
(1999) and Shenhar (2001). Shenhar and Dvir (1996) took issue with the sparse theoretical 
development of the project management literature. They contrasted it with the literature on 
innovation, which reflected a contingent approach to management of innovation for complex 
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products or services. The particular dichotomized view – incremental versus radical innovation - 
suggested that organizations performing more innovative tasks (characterized by a greater degree 
of uncertainty) should be inherently different from those performing routine tasks or producing 
routine products (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Bart, 1988; Burton & Obel, 2004; C. Freeman, 
1997). Invoking classical contingency theory, Shenhar and Dvir (1996) and later Shenhar (2001) 
suggested that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to project management is counter-productive. They 
proposed a typological theory (inspired by (Doty & Glick, 1994)) of project management, in 
which project management style could be matched to project characteristics or features. Their 
conceptual typological model was developed using the dimensions of technological uncertainty 
(low, medium, high, super-high) and system scope (assembly, system, array). This model 
retained the structural and hierarchical connotations from the early system sciences (Boulding, 
1956; Van Gigch & Churchman, 1978), early design literature (Alexander, 1964; Marples, 
1961), and systems architecture (Rechtin, 1992; Rechtin, 1999). It also linked the 
operationalization of hierarchy to the degree of uncertainty in complex projects. The typological 
model thus broadened and extended the concept of project complexity beyond Baccarini’s (1996) 
earlier definition. 
Williams picked up on Turner & Cochrane’s (1993) articulation of the concept of 
uncertainty in terms of the degree of uncertainty in goals, and the degree of uncertainty in means. 
Uncertainty was used loosely to include both aleatoric and epistemic uncertainties, i.e. those 
stemming from a lack of knowledge. The former type - goal uncertainty - was found to result in 
increased feedbacks of a reciprocal nature in complex projects, through scope change. The latter 
type – novelty in technological means - was one of the dimensions in Shenhar and Dvir’s 
typological model.  The refined framework proposed by Williams therefore subsumed both 
structural complexity (number, diversity and interdependence of elements) and uncertainty 
(scope, novelty) (Williams, 1999; Williams, 2002), conceptualized collectively as ‘overall 
project complexity’. 
Relatively recent work on understanding the dynamic emergent behavior of projects as 
complex systems has reinforced the structural nature of complexity and reciprocal 
interdependent relationships (Lyneis, Cooper, & Els, 2001; Lyneis & Ford, 2007; Williams, 
Ackermann, & Eden, 2003). Emergent behavior can be defined as the unpredictable 
consequences arising from the non-linear interaction of the system’s parts (Simon, 1982). This 
body of work has improved the understanding of how complex projects behave, and linked 
causal factors to project outcomes through post hoc analysis using systems modeling approaches. 
A main learning is that project behavior derives from “systemic interrelated sets of factors” 
rather than single causal factors and that true causes of project outcomes are difficult to identify 
(Cooper, Lyneis, & Bryant, 2002; T. Williams, 2005). Extreme behavior was found to be a result 
of the presence of positive feedback loops in the system’s structure, i.e. “vicious cycles” and 
knock-on effects.  
Tight time-constraints were also suggested as a feature of projects that have the potential 
to compound shocks or errors (Williams, 2005). When projects go off-track under a tight 
schedule, managerial interventions aiming to accelerate projects often further exacerbate adverse 
outcomes such as cost overruns or delays. Shenhar and Dvir (2004) also separately discussed the 
significance of pace – the urgency with which a project must be delivered and the consequences 
of failing to do so. Overall project complexity could therefore be further broadened to include 
not only structural complexity and uncertainty, but also their time-based interaction through 
pace. Shenhar and Dvir consolidated these aspects of complexity in their NCTP: Novelty, 
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Complexity, Technology, Pace model, a more comprehensive typological model for categorizing 
projects (Shenhar & Dvir, 2004; Shenhar & Dvir, 2007). 
While many of these treatments of project complexity include social or organizational 
dimensions, most are focused primarily on technical aspects. A parallel literature grounded in 
sociology, in contrast, places organizational dynamics at the core of project complexity with a 
focus on safety (Perrow, 1986; Vaughan, 1996). Orr and Scott (2008) identify regulatory, 
normative, and cognitive aspects of institutions as key elements of the context of projects 
document project managers’ failure to recognize them (“institutional exceptions”) as key drivers 
of failure.  
We believe that it is important to include both technical and institutional domains of 
complexity since both are evident in major projects, and, if anything, variations in institutional 
precursors to complexity contribute more to explanations of project outcomes than purely 
technical aspects. We also believe that it is important allow for different structures and dynamics 
in the two domains. 
We also believe that it is important to include organizational process aspects within of 
complexity, either in terms of the dynamics of project realization or the on the experience of 
individuals ‘living’ the complexity of projects (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Hughes (2000) was 
one of the first to examine the role of ‘system builders’ (or ‘system architects’), the individuals 
or entities that championed complex projects and effected the formation of coalitions and 
processes for their realization. Cicmil & Marshall (2005) studied the concept of complexity 
through the lens of actuality – the lived experience of a project’s participants and projects 
(Cicmil, Williams, Thomas, & Hodgson, 2006). To a large extent however, structural complexity 
was viewed primarily as a technical issue, and was treated separately from process aspects of 
complexity in projects.   
Bosch-Rekveldt et al’s (2011) Technical-Organizational-Environmental (T-O-E) 
framework is an important step in this direction. Based on an extensive review of the literature 
and empirical case study work in the process-engineering domain, the T-O-E framework 
includes 50 constructs. It reflects many of the structural features identified by Baccarini (1996) 
and Williams (2002), mostly in the Technical domain and some in the Organizational domain. 
Uncertainty is reflected in the form of ‘risk’ in all three domains, whereas contextual factors such 
as ‘stakeholders’ and project ‘location’ are categorized in the Environmental domain. This last 
category is the main extension of the TOE model over previous frameworks (Bosch-Rekveldt et 
al, 2011).  
While the T-O-E model was proposed as a characterization framework, it does not 
present the same typological features as the NCTP model or Shenhar’s (2001) framework in that 
it doesn’t allow for an understanding of how the presence or absence, or the degree to which the 
elements contribute to overall complexity. A contingent approach to managing projects or 
structuring them on the basis of their overall complexity requires some systematic differentiation 
of the nature and degree of complexity along various dimensions (Burton & Obel, 2004; Levitt, 
2011). Scott (2012) argues that the features or challenges presented by the normative and 
cultural-cognitive institutions in the project environment and a sophisticated understanding of the 
organizational field can better inform the contingency-based project structuring approach. 
We propose a conceptual model called the House of Project Complexity that attempts to 
systematize both (technical and institutional) structural and process elements and that appears 
very similar to TOE, but is different in important respects. First, we begin with a set of technical 
and institutional variables that are inherent in the project opportunity and overlay these with a set 
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of architectural characteristics, also both technical are organizational, that are put in place as the 
opportunity is shaped into a defined project and ultimately executed. We also link the elements 
to the features of uncertainty and risk, and emergent behavioral properties of projects. The 
framework is based on the literature and on two stages of exploratory analysis described in the 
following section. 
 
3. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The initial version of our conceptual model grew out of Lessard’s (2007) exploratory 
efforts to examine the hypothesis that projects that are complex in both the technical and 
institutional domains exhibit poorer performance (on average) and more varied performance 
outcomes. Using publicly available data on 45 major projects in the oil & gas industry, we scored 
each project in terms of technical (‘T’) and institutional (‘I’) characteristics associated with 
complexity and related them to performance (see Appendix A for the prompts we used). We 
treated technical and organizational complexity as independent dimensions and performance as 
the dependent emergent dimension. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Initial model of the House of Project Complexity 
 
Figure 1 depicts the basic ‘House’ of complexity, which we used as visual metaphor to 
preserve the structural connotation (Baccarini, 1996; Eppinger and Browning, 2012). 
Performance emerges as the ‘roof’ of the house. Appendix A contains a detailed description of 
our initial exploratory analysis, including the scaling method for operational indicators for both T 
and O complexity, descriptive statistics, ANOVA analysis, and regression results for the 
relationship between performance and T and O complexity. The regression results supported our 
intuition that the interaction of technical complexity and organizational complexity had a more 
important effect on project project’s performance than their independent individual 
contributions. Specifically, project performance worsened in our sample (p < 0.01) along with an 
increase in the dispersion of performance, as the relative overall compound (T*O) complexity 
increased, with better fit than T or O individually or additive T+O. 
In a further exploratory analysis, we examined the relationship between complexity and 
project size using a different data set of 30 major projects, all from one firm the oil & gas 
domain. This is of interest since it is common industry practice is to use cost (materiality) as a 
proxy for the degree of complexity or difficulty in assigning resources and in benchmarking 
performance. Observations of the expected capital cost of each project were available for each 
project in this dataset, but observations on performance were unavailable. In this iteration, we 
added another dimension of complexity – architectural (‘A’) –to denote the extent to which 
managerial choices in either the technical or institutional (‘I’, previously organizational ‘O’) 
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domains appeared to have contributed to or ameliorated the project’s complexity. A group of 
experienced project managers were then asked to score the projects along each of the T, I, and A 
dimensions, using indicators similar to those discussed in Appendix A. Projects were scored 
from 1 – 7 along each dimension with 1: benign and 7: extreme. Capital cost ($) was left as a 
continuous variable. A positive correlation (0.49, p<0.01) was obtained between a multiplicative 
(T*I*A) scale and expected capital cost ($). As the expected capital cost increased, the subjective 
assessment of the relative complexity of projects also increased. When complexity (T*I*A) was 
regressed on capital cost, however, very little of the variation was explained (adjusted R^2 of 
0.14) even though the relationship is significant with p<0.05. Further, the outliers from this 
complexity/size relationship were meaningful to the analysts. This analysis confirmed our 
intuition that capital cost or project budget is not a good indicator of project complexity. 
This exploratory analysis revealed a number of conceptual and methodological issues. 
First, it was not always easy to separate structural indicators of technical complexity from those 
of organizational complexity, especially in terms of the chosen project design. Some elements 
could just as easily be categorized as either ‘T’ or ‘I’.  
Second, project designers had selected project concepts and structures based on their 
perception of the technical and organizational features, and their understanding of project-
specific risks. These choices were at a higher level of abstraction in the project, e.g. at the level 
of defining project scope and technology selection.  
These two observations taken together led to our refined HoPC with a clear separation of 
inherent technical and institutional features and a set of architectural features that include both 
technical and institutional aspects that are overlaid on inherent features during concept selection 
and engineering design. 
 
4. PRIMARY RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA 
Our main objective in this study is to identify the specific phenomena and features of 
projects that relate to our conceptualization of complexity and to test the relationship between 
them and project performance. Armed with the basic construct of the House of Project 
Complexity comprised of Technical, Institutional, and Architectural dimensions, we do this 
using a sample of LIPs that include much more detailed narratives than either of our two 
exploratory samples. Our approach uses coding of case-study write-ups to identify key concepts 
and relationships and further develop and refine the proposed framework. We proceed in three 
steps, beginning with formulation of a coding protocol, to relational analysis and framework 
development in the final step (Table 1). We discuss the data, methodological details of each step, 
and the main outcomes of the analysis. 
While the earlier versions of the HoPC relied on data from the oil & gas sectors, we 
wanted to see if the HoPC construct was useful in other large project sectors, particularly large 
infrastructure projects. The data comprise in-depth case studies of 20 large projects. The case 
studies were prepared for the IMEC Research Program, a benchmarking study for best practices 
in large projects, based on interviews with key participants and questionnaires to project 
sponsors. The set of projects spans electric power, hydro development, roads, bridges, tunnels, 
urban transportation, and an airport. The earliest projects in the sample were undertaken in the 
early 1980s. Some were completed only recently in the 2000s. Average project size is 
approximately USD 1 billion, with geographical representation from North America, Europe, 
Latin America and Asia.  
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Although the IMEC projects have been analyzed extensively in Miller and Lessard 
(2001) and other works, and have led to a number of theoretical frameworks, the cases have not 
been studied in depth to gain insight into the idea of project complexity per se. For our purposes, 
the data can therefore be considered to be a new sample. 
Our method is summarized in Table 1 above. Based on the examination of the literature 
and previous work discussed above, we first formulated a coding protocol to identify key 
concepts in the case data signifying technical or institutional challenges, and performance 
outcomes (Step 1). A test case was used to refine the coding protocol. The refined coding 
protocol (Step 2) was applied to a sub-sample of four cases from the same infrastructure domain 
(electric power). We set the remaining 15 cases aside at this stage to avoid contaminating the 
data. We assigned concepts to categories, and refined both. We then selected and coded another 
four cases (transportation), at which point we felt we had reached “conceptual saturation.”  At 
this stage, we also began to identify relationships between categories, which informed our 
formulation of the relational analysis. Finally, we used cognitive mapping to relate concept 
categories to each other to flesh out the House of Project Complexity framework (Step 3). The 
main goal of the relational analysis step is to describe how the refined categories of concepts are 
related to each other. Specifically, how are project features related to project life-cycle properties 
and performance outcomes? To do this, we axially and selectively coded the 11 remaining cases 
in the data set. 
 
Table 1. Steps for substantiating the House of Project Complexity theoretical framework 
 
Step 1: Development of coding protocol 
• Project is the unit of analysis 
• Objective is to look for key words and phrases that signify technical or institutional challenges, 
performance outcomes 
• Decision to code interactively, i.e. have an idea of some words to code for that indicate concept, but may 
also decide to add categories, dimension that evidence concept 
 What predefined set of concepts to code for? 
 T: elements, #elements, interdependence, diversity, novelty 
 I: interests, #interests, alignment between interests, maturity, dynamism 
 What to code for interactively? 
 Intermediate/architectural constructs: 
 ‘Ility’ implications, performance outcomes: 
 Episodes, scope change events, outcomes 
• Using a test case, identify occurrence of terms, phrases describing challenges, architectural choices, & 
life-cycle properties or –ilities, and any known performance outcomes. 
• Refined coding protocol further 
 
Step 2: Coding of stratified sub-samples 
• Selected stratified sub-sample of four cases (electric power) 
• Looked for levels of abstraction/generality for placements of concepts in categories 
• Added another four cases to stratified sub-sample, one from each quadrant in same domain (roads) 
• Refined concepts, categories and reached conceptual saturation, categories; also looked for emerging 
relationships between categories 
 
Step 3: Preliminary question for relational analysis in axial coding 
 “How are project features related to life-cycle properties and performance outcomes?” 
• Used cognitive mapping to link categories of concepts in a process-based framework using 11 remaining 
cases => House of Project Complexity	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5. RESULTS – THE FULL HOUSE OF PROJECT COMPLEXITY 
Detailed coding of the twenty case studies resulted in conceptual maps of how concepts 
occurring in the cases related to each other and across categories. Figure 2 illustrates the 
conceptual map for the Eurotunnel (or Channel Tunnel) project from our sample. In the map, 
concepts about fundamental project features such as the legislative context, regulatory 
framework, and geological or climatic challenges appear on the left. In the middle, design 
choices and architectural arrangements such as the tunnel design concept and syndicated project 
financing appear in the middle, and flow from the features on the left. The project’s functional 
properties and design or economic outcomes are situated on the right. These are a result of both 
the features on the left and constructs in the middle. We abstracted from concept maps to 
populate our refined House of Project Complexity, in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 2. Concept Map for the Eurotunnel Project 
 
After populating the HoPC, we observed that projects could be scored using the HoPC 
along a number of dimensions in terms of degree of complexity. For example, we scored the 
Eurotunnel project as high on complexity on both its technical and institutional features as well 
as high in complexity in the architecture arrangements. This process was repeated for the other 
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cases in the sample. The scoring analysis and its results are discussed later in this section, after 
presenting the House of Project Complexity. 
The HoPC has two ‘stories’ and a ‘roof’, for a total of three layers. The bottom layer 
contains “Inherent Features” in both the technical and institutional domain, which are the 
foundation for the structure of the project in those dimensions. The layer “Architectural 
Constructs and Arrangements” rests immediately above and interacts with “inherent features”. 
Architecture represents the project concepts that were actively chosen or shaped, given the 
inherent features. The uppermost layer or the roof of the House represents the many emergent 
properties or ‘Ilities’ of the projects in delivery that may drive project outcomes. While the layers 
are explained further below, Appendix B provides a detailed definition of the concepts with 
citations for the sources of definitions, and examples or indicators of the concepts. 
 
      
Figure 3. The Full House of Project Complexity 
 
Inherent features in the foundation of the House describe the fundamental technical and 
institutional nature and characteristics of the project opportunity. Such features tend to be a 
given, and independent of the particular project concept (or “solution”). Inherent features are the 
raw material with which architecture sculpts a project opportunity into a realizable project. The 
sub-categories of ‘Framework’ and ‘Interests’ represent features of an institutional nature, 
whereas ‘Location’ and ‘Elements’ denote technical characteristics of the project opportunity. 
We find that there are parallels between inherent features in the technical and institutional 
domain, such as number, interdependence, dynamism, and novelty. This is one of our 
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contributions in refining the concept of complexity beyond the broader ‘Environmental’ category 
of the T-O-E framework (Bosch-Rekveldt et al 2011). 
Architectural constructs and arrangements transform inherent features to realize the 
project. Architecture is therefore the mediating layer between features emergent properties, since 
it uses the features of the project primarily as context, needs and requirements. This category 
contains concepts that represent the processes – both technical and institutional – by which the 
form, organization, and logistical activities of the LIP are shaped and eventually fixed. Locking 
in design aspects, setting scale and scope, pacing or selecting technologies are of a more 
technical nature, although they have organizational aspects. Similarly, financing structures, 
public-private contractual arrangements, and coordination and logistics are primarily 
institutional/organizational in nature, with some technical implications. Architectural 
arrangements are therefore harder to categorize as purely technical or institutional. These 
concepts provide a high degree of detail and specificity about high individuals or entities engage 
in an explicit process of project architecting, or shaping as in Lessard and Miller (2013). 
Architectural activities intend to achieve project design goals or objectives and desirable 
performance properties, for which the project was conceived.  
Emergent properties/ ’Ilities’ are the uppermost level of the House. These concepts 
broadly represent outcomes of the process of project architecting. They thus broaden the 
understanding of project performance beyond the usual cost or schedule outcomes. The emergent 
properties are the result of the interdependence and interactions between various technical and 
institutional features of the project and the architectural constructs and arrangements that mediate 
these features. The qualifier emergence signifies a possible departure or deviation from the 
properties that project architects originally architected for or intended. Deviation is not always 
observed – sometimes properties are aligned with goals and needs, sometimes they are not. In 
essence, the HoPC is a conceptual frame that attempts to explain how and why an LIP’s 
outcomes and properties emerge. 
The twenty cases drawn from the IMEC study were coded and scored along the inherent 
technical and institutional dimensions as either low (‘L’) or high (‘H’) complexity. Projects 
could thus fall in one of four quadrants based on their inherent complexity score, as shown at the 
top of Table 2. We also scored each in terms of architectural complexity (‘L’ or ‘H’). Project 
performance was scored as a success (‘Y’) if the project achieved both its stated functional 
design goals and articulated economic profitability objectives. If a project missed either set of 
goals and objectives, possibly because of episodic delays, rework, schedule extensions, budget 
overruns, or other uncontrollable shocks that we sought to identify, the project was deemed 
unsuccessful. Table 2 lists project scores along these dimensions, and also shows the relative 
sorting of projects based on match and performance.  
Scoring enables simple statistical analysis of the relationship between inherent 
complexity, architectural complexity and performance. The projects in our sample are spread 
quite evenly among the four quadrants of complexity in inherent features. Tests of association 
show that for the projects in our sample, success is associated with low inherent institutional 
complexity (X^2 = 7.18, p < 0.01), independent of inherent technical and architectural 
complexity. Project success is not independently associated with the two latter dimensions for 
our sample. This result suggests that although technical and architectural complexities matter for 
performance, institutional complexity matters more. 
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Table 2. Complexity and Performance Scoring for the IMEC cases 
 
 
 
In scoring architectural complexity in our sample, we found that scores largely 
corresponded to the average within-project scores for T and I. This of course could reflect the 
fact that project architecture tends to respond to inherent technical and institutional features, but 
also that we did not have sufficiently fine grained temporal data to know when particular 
architectural constructs were laid in for the projects. We also noted in a number of cases that a 
high degree of architectural complexity appeared to be a well aligned with the given T and I 
structure and challenges of the project, but that in others a lesser degree of architectural 
complexity was disconnected from the inherent features. Further discussion among the coders of 
‘match’ or ‘mismatch’ cases led us to begin thinking in terms of ‘requisite architectural 
complexity’.  
 In the Orlyval light rail project on the outskirts of Paris, for example, the chosen 
architecture was highly simplified to push the project through, without addressing a number of 
the diverse interests characterizing the initial context. As a result the deliberative and benefit-
capturing structures were ill suited to align the complex constellation of interests involved in the 
project. The project is an economic failure, even though it is a technical and functional success. 
Project architects in other cases with low technical but high institutional complexity such as the 
Nanko Power Plant or Highway 407 Express Toll Route in Canada crafted the architectural 
arrangements carefully. In Nanko, the firm sponsoring the project prioritized extensive 
stakeholder consultations and community involvement, whose interests broadened the project’s 
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technical scope but also made it much more acceptable to the local community, creating a higher 
likelihood of project success. In the Highway 407 ETR project, the architecture was made more 
complex by inserting a value engineering stage, carefully coordinating the concurrent integrated 
design from the start, and allocating risks differentially between the provincial authority and the 
private developers, enabling both a functional and economically successful project. 
The Thames Water Ring, which can be analyzed as a project in two phases, is also 
instructive. In its first phase, it employed fairly simple functional contracts with limited 
information sharing. After this approach failed, it adopted a “matrixed” integrated approach with 
a high degree of best practice sharing and coordination among various contractors, and moved 
the ownership of tunneling machines from contractors to the authority. This could be seen as a 
much more complex contracting and execution architecture but in fact it also resulted in greater 
information sharing and alignment. These examples show that project architecture itself can be 
complex enough to moderate or mitigate inherent complexity. 
To preliminarily test if the concept of ‘requisite architectural complexity’ was associated 
with performance, we revisited the cases and assigned scores based on whether we thought the 
chosen architecture was a match (‘M’) or not a match (‘NM’) based on the project’s inherent 
features. The 2x2 arrangement of scores is shown at the bottom of Table 2. We found that here is 
a higher incidence of success when the complexity of a project’s architecture was judged to 
match the complexity of its inherent features. The probability that the project outcome is a 
success for architectural match is greater than for no match (X^2 = 12.175, p < 0.001). These 
results support our intuition that architecture can modify complexity in inherent project features 
to improve performance. While we tried to separate our coding of architectural match and 
performance, there is some possibility that one influenced the other. Going forward, the N/NM 
coding and ‘requisite architectural complexity’ sub-dimension would also be specified ex ante as 
part of the architectural layer, as shown in the refined House of Project Complexity (Figure 4 - 
center). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Refined House of Project Complexity with Project Architecting and Risk Emergence 
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Insights from coding the cases in detail and exploring the concept of requisite 
architectural complexity helped us to map the process of project architecting and risk emergence 
on to the static structural HoPC (Figure 4). Project architecting in the left of the figure describes 
the high level abstract process of first creating an infrastructure project concept to meet 
stakeholder needs and objectives and then taking the concept all the way to realization in a series 
of phases. The House in the central part of the figure is our much-refined representation of the 
project structure that emerges in various stages of project architecting. The right most part of the 
figure denotes risks that emerge as a consequence of the interaction of structural components and 
background uncertainties during the process of project architecting. Project architecting involves 
shaping or modification of structural features to accommodate or manage risks, thereby 
accommodating the overall complexity of an infrastructure project (Lessard and Miller, 2012). 
Project architects are the subset of a LIP’s stakeholders that work actively to take the 
project from concept to reality (Miller and Lessard, 2001; Lessard and Miller, 2012; Merrow, 
2011). While stakeholders can be thought of as all the individuals and entities that are affected 
by a project and may even influence its development, the architects are those that actively and 
directly influence, control, design or manage some aspect of the LIP’s progress. Project 
architects often work in close concert with other stakeholders to bring the LIP to fruition, but the 
other stakeholders do not bear the same degree of responsibility in advancing the LIP from one 
stage to the next. Fred Salvucci, for example, played an important architecting role in Boston’s 
Central Artery/Tunnel (‘Big Dig’) project (Hughes, 2000), Just as the project’s stakeholder set 
may evolve dynamically over a project’s life, so can different individuals and entities fulfill the 
role of project architects. Shaping is consequently a messy and episodic process in which 
architects work hard to move a project from the opportunity to the outcome space through 
strategic moves with risk-resolution in mind. 
Societal needs for infrastructure services create a project opportunity space, the starting 
point for the process of project architecting. The opportunity space maps onto the Inherent 
Project Features layer in the structural core of the HoPC. The raison d’etre of a project concept 
and ultimately the project itself is to realize a subset of the opportunities present in the 
opportunity space in the form of a project. The process of architecting moves into the project 
solution space by locking in some dimensions of the opportunity space. A project concept can be 
executed or implemented in many ways. In design terminology, project design concepts relate 
combinations of form to desired functions – each detailed form-function combination can be 
thought of as a design solution. It maps onto ‘Architectural Arrangements and Constructs’ and 
‘Architectural Match’. The solution space is thus the collection of different form-function 
combinations, representing design in not only the technical domain but also in the institutional 
domain.  The process ends with the outcomes space, when the emergent properties are observed, 
as indicated by the roof of the House. 
Risks either emerge because of the inherent technical and institutional structural drivers, 
the layering of architectural constructs, or are unearthed during the process of architecting. The 
process of risk emergence is mapped in parallel to the right of the structural House in Figure 4. 
The discussion of risks is well developed in Miller and Lessard (2001) and Lessard and Miller 
(2012). 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 We have proposed The House of Project Complexity as a conceptual framework for 
understanding and interpreting the core concepts of complexity in Large Infrastructure Projects. 
The HoPC comprises three principal components: the foundation of the house that captures the 
technical and institutional elements of the project opportunity that contribute to complexity, a set 
of technical and institutional architectural choices that are put in place as a project concept and 
core coalition takes form, and the set of performance outcomes or “ilities” that emerge as the 
project is engineered, constructed, and put into operation. This “house” in turn can be seen as 
linking the process of project architecting with performance and risk emergence over the 
project’s life. 
The HoPC is based on a rich projects literature that considers structural conditions and 
dynamic uncertainty, as well project process dynamics, as contributors to overall project 
complexity. It is developed iteratively through two trial applications in our exploratory analyses 
and one “proof of concept” test on the IMEC case studies.  
A main contribution of our work is the conceptual distinction between project features 
that are inherent to project opportunities (inherent features), those that are conditional on the 
selection of a project concept including its governance structure and execution process 
(architectural features), and those that arise from the interaction of these two sets of features as 
the project is shaped and managed over time. We then relate these to various the high-level 
project outcomes and emergent properties of the LIP – the “ilities.” A second contribution is to 
separate the inherent features into technical and institutional domains and to develop these two in 
a parallel fashion. A third contribution is to connect complexity with the concept of project 
architecting, developed initially in Miller and Lessard (2001) and extended in Lessard and Miller 
(2012).  
We use the HoPC framework to classify LIPs based on a project’s degree of complexity 
in both the technical and the institutional domains, and to test whether this typology helps 
explain variation in project performance.  We believe that the results demonstrate the validity of 
breaking project elements into inherent technical and institutional features, project architecture, 
and emergent outcomes in line with the dynamic temporal nature of projects.  
We believe that the “House of Project Complexity” may be generally extended to other 
substantive contexts that exhibit similar properties as Large Infrastructure Projects (LIPs) -- 
extractive industries, large manufacturing projects, or other industrial megaprojects and we hope 
that it will provide a context for further discussion, framework development, and testing. 
Several logical next steps include: 1) formalizing the elements of the HoPC through 
Design Structure Matrices and other similar models of the elements and interdependencies in the 
technical and institutional space, 2) deepening the concept of “match” that emerges as a central 
element in our “proof of concept” test and 3) applying the framework to additional samples of 
projects. 
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APPENDIX A. 
This section describes the first exploratory analysis of 45 projects in the oil and gas sector 
that led to the initial construct of the House of Project Complexity (HoPC), based on Lessard 
(2007).  
Table A1 summarizes the scaling system used for determining complexity and 
performance scores.  The degree of complexity was based on a subjective assessment of project 
features including reservoir geology, climate, remoteness of location, novelty of technical means 
(in the ‘T’ domain); and operatorship, host stability, host requirements and contractual 
relationships (in the ‘O’ domain). Projects were scored on a scale of 1 – 5 along both these 
independent dimensions with 1 representing the least complex or “benign” projects and 5 
representing the most complex or “extreme” projects. Although the scores reflect the use of 
judgment and are subjective (they do not “measure” complexity), they are reasonably objective 
when applied in a relative sense – “less” or “more” complex, for example. 
 
Table A1. Descriptions and Scales for Relative Scoring of Complexity & 
Performance in Oil & Gas Projects (Lessard, 2007) 
 
Complexity Dimensions 
Technical (‘T’) Complexity 
(1: Low – 5: High) 
 
Reservoir – does the project have particularly 
complicated reservoir geology, high pressure or sour 
gas, or more importantly a combination of these 
features?  
 
Geography/climate – is the project in a 
particularly difficult environment, either in terms of 
sensitivity (endangered species, migration routes) or 
hostility (extreme heat or cold which make construction 
and operation difficult)? 
 
Remoteness – is the project is far from existing 
resources? 
 
 
 
Novelty - does the project apply new 
technology or pushes existing technology beyond 
current experience? 
 
Organizational (‘O’) Complexity 
(1: Low – 5: High) 
 
Operatorship – are there are many 
shareholders, and/or decision making must be done by a 
qualified majority? 
 
 
Host Stability – for example does the host 
Government have a stable regulatory, fiscal or legal 
environment?  
 
 
 
Host Requirements – is there a demanding 
Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) in place, or large 
local content requirements?   
 
Contractual relationships – are there are 
many contractors involved, with intricate relationships 
between them? 
 
 
Performance Dimension 
Schedule Delays 
(1: Good – 3: Poor) 
 
 1   - Delay of less than 1 year 
 2   - Delay of 1 – 2 years 
 3   - Delay of more than 2 years 
 
Budget Overruns 
(1: Good – 3: Poor) 
 
 1   - Less than 25% over budget 
 2   - Between 25 – 50% over budget 
 3   - More than 50% over budget 
 
 21 
 
 
Performance was operationalized in the form of schedule delay5 and budget overruns. 
Each performance indicator had three levels in the scoring scale (Schedule: 1 – ‘< one year 
delay’; 2 -  ‘one to two year delay’; 3 – ‘> two year delay’ and Budget: 1 – ‘< 25% over budget’; 
2 – ‘25-50% over budget’; 3 – ‘> 50% over budget’). Projects deemed to perform well thus 
received low scores. Overall performance was determined additively i.e. by adding the scores of 
the two indicators such that overall performance ranged from 2 – 6 across all projects. 
Indicator scores were categorized by both overall technical complexity and overall 
organizational complexity. Note that the minimum technical complexity score was 3, suggesting 
that none of the projects in the sample could be considered technically benign. Organizational 
complexity scores did in fact range from 1 to 5.  
The sample was then broken by “eyeball” into two groups according to T*O, least 
complex and most complex. The descriptive statistics for the two groups, shown in Table 2, 
suggest that complexity leads to both lower (average) performance and a great dispersion of 
performance.  
 
Table A2. Descriptive statistics: Complexity and Performance 
 
 Least complex (N = 28) Most complex (N = 17) 
Average T score (SD) 3.54 (0.58) 4.24 (0.66) 
Average O score (SD) 2.86 (0.93) 4.12 (0.70) 
Average Performance score (SD) 3.21 (1.50) 4.06 (1.43) 
 
A subsequent statistical analysis of these eyeball results confirms the initial intuition. 
Table A3 shows descriptive statistics, ANOVA results, and correlation of each indicator with 
overall complexity scores using the indicators described in Table A2 above.  
Based on the ANOVA results for technical complexity, mean scores are found to be 
significantly different across categories (p<0.001) in ‘Geography/Climate’ and ‘Novelty’ and 
less so (p<0.01) for ‘Remoteness’. In other words, variance of scores within the category groups 
is significantly less than variance across category groups for these indicators. These three 
indicators are also positively correlated with the overall technical complexity score, as shown by 
both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, suggesting that the overall technical 
complexity score is a reasonable compound indicator. The inter-item reliability analysis (alphas 
ranging from 0.65 – 0.75) further supports the use of the overall technical complexity scale as a 
compound indicator. ‘Reservoir’ appears to be uncorrelated and brings down inter-item 
reliability, but it is retained in the compound indicator to avoid loss of information. 
Under the organizational complexity categorization, mean scores of ‘Host Stability’, 
‘Host Requirements’ and ‘Contractual Relationships’ are significantly different across categories 
(p<0.001). These indicators are also positively correlated with overall organizational complexity. 
Once again the high correlation and high alpha reliability scores (0.79 – 0.92) supports the use of 
organizational complexity as a compound scale. ‘Operatorship’ is also retained in the compound 
organizational complexity indicator to avoid loss of information. 
                                                
 
5 It is well recognized that initially overambitious schedules are often imposed on major projects (see e.g. Priemus 
(2008), and that this schedule pressure is itself a source of complexity, introducing the potential for correlated errors 
between the dependent and independent variable. However, deviations from publically announced schedules are the 
only information available in the public record. 
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Table A3. Descriptive Statistics, ANOVA and Reliability Analysis for Scoring of Technical & Organizational 
Complexity 
 
Table A4. Three-step Hierarchical Regression of Performance on Technical, Organization 
Complexity Scores 
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The compound scores of complexity were then regressed against performance scores to 
explore the relationship between complexity and performance. A three-step hierarchical 
regression was used, in which five models were tested (Table A4). In the first step, the 
independent effects of Technical Complexity (T) only, Organizational Complexity (O) only, and 
both T and O were examined. Only the model with both T and O was found to be significant 
(p<0.05). In the second step, the additive term T+O was tested and found to be significant, 
however the best fit was obtained in the third step when the multiplicative interaction term T*O 
was tested (Model 5, p <0.01). These results support the proposition that the interaction of 
project features contributing to technical complexity and organizational complexity affect a 
project’s performance. Specifically, project performance was found to worsen in our sample as 
the relative overall compound (T*O) complexity increased. 
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APPENDIX B 
This section provides detailed definitions, citations and indicators/examples for the 
concepts populating the House of Project Complexity, as described in Section 5. The main 
concept categories are Inherent Features (the bottom layer), Architectural Constructs and 
Arrangements (the intermediate layer) and Emergent Properties/ ‘Ilities’ (the uppermost layer, 
the roof of the House. 
 
B1. Inherent Features 
Inherent features are those project features or characteristics that are common to the 
project and precede the architectural choices in the process of project architecting or shaping. 
Inherent features are of four main types – Framework and Interests (in the institutional domain), 
and Location and Elements (in the technical domain). Table B1 defines the concepts contained in 
the Inherent Features category. 
 
Table B1. Inherent Project Features in the House of Project Complexity 
Category 
• Concept 
Definition Indicator / Example 
 
Framework 
• Legislative 
 
 
 
 
• Regulatory  
 
 
 
 
• Normative  
 
 
 
 
• Cultural-cognitive 
 
 
The legal framework that forms a basis for decisions 
and actions in the infrastructure domain. Formulated by 
deliberation and analysis in sovereign or regional law-
making bodies  
 
The framework of rules that instruments the intent of 
legislation. Made legitimate by legal sanction   
 
 
 
The code that determines what is socially appropriate 
on the basis of moral beliefs; “prescriptive, evaluative, 
and obligatory dimension” (Scott, 2008) 
 
 
Shared conceptions and beliefs of a community that 
constitute the “nature of social reality” through patterns 
of thinking feeling and acting (Geertz, 1973; Hofstede, 
2005) 
 
 
 
Privatization, or private 
participation 
 
 
 
Rule-setting, monitoring and 
sanctioning activities; 
markets’ processes (Scott, 
2012) 
 
Value-based domains such 
as religious communities, 
kinship systems, status and 
prestige orders 
 
Epistemic systems such as 
religious, philosophical, 
intellectual and ideological 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Scott, 
2012) 
 
Interests 
• Number of 
Stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Interdependence  
 
 
 
The number of individuals, entities, or groups that can 
“affect or are affected by achievement of the 
organization’s objectives” (R. E. Freeman, 1984; R. E. 
Freeman, Harrison, & Wicks, 2007) or “have an interest 
in the actions of an organization and the ability to 
influence it” (Savage, Nix, Whitehead, & Blair, 1991) 
 
The one-way or two-way flow of information, 
processes, or materials between the stakeholders that 
are critical for project architecting to proceed  
 
 
Corporations, banks, 
regulatory agencies, 
consumer groups, 
contractors, residents of a 
region 
 
 
 
Contractual, informational, 
or material interdependence; 
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• Similarity/Alignment  
 
 
 
• Dynamism 
 
 
 
 
• Novelty/Maturity 
 
 
 
• Expertise 
 
 
 
• Legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The degree of ‘likeness’ among the stakeholders that 
allows for their categorization or treatment as a class of 
individual or entities 
 
The degree of change or variation in the needs, 
preferences, and interdependent interactions between 
stakeholders over time that may affect their power to 
influence (Chinyio & Akintoye, 2008) 
 
The extent to which organizational age, experience and 
precedent actions of stakeholders influence their future 
actions and interactions (Jawahar & McLaughlin, 2001) 
 
Differentiating set of skills and knowledge possessed 
by firm or entity in a particular domain 
 
 
The unique characteristics of the particular individual 
or entity that lends credibility to the project concept. 
may be pooled, sequential or 
reciprocal (Thompson, 1967) 
 
 
Consumer advocacy group 
representing many 
consumers 
 
Investment preferences, 
willingness to pay 
 
 
 
Novel/birth, emergent / 
growth, mature, revival 
 
 
Nuclear plant design, deep 
sea exploration 
 
 
Reputation, track record, 
brand 
 
Location 
• Development 
 
 
 
• Proximity 
 
 
 
 
• Geography/Geology 
 
 
 
• Climate 
 
 
The extent to which the geographical region under 
consideration for a project opportunity has undergone 
prior infrastructure work 
 
The physical closeness of the geographical 
region to supply chain nodes or demand centers for the 
output of projects 
 
 
The difficulty of performing site-related 
activities such as site preparation, excavation, drilling, 
construction, or even life-cycle operation 
 
The extent to which weather cycles and temperature in 
the geographical region make project-related activities 
difficult. 
 
 
 
Greenfield, brownfield 
 
 
 
Urban, suburban, 
rural, remote 
 
 
 
Deep-sea reservoir, 
sub-surface transport 
 
 
Storms, extreme 
temperatures, precipitation 
 
Elements 
• Number of Elements 
 
 
 
 
• Interdependence  
 
 
 
 
 
The number of discrete artifacts, components or tasks 
that required to achieve intended functionality of a 
project concept (Dewar & Hage, 1978; G. A. Miller, 
1956) 
 
The relationship between entities that cannot exist or 
operate without each other (De Weck, Roos, & Magee, 
2011). The one-way or two-way flow of information, 
processes, or materials between the elements or sub-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May be pooled, sequential or 
reciprocal (Thompson, 1967) 
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• Diversity of 
disciplines 
 
 
 
• Dynamism 
 
 
• Novelty/Maturity 
 
systems that is critical for a project opportunity to be 
fully conceptualized or formulated. 
 
The number and degree of difference between the 
trades/functional domains/expertise invoked by a 
project opportunity (Baccarini, 1996) 
 
 
The degree of change or variation in the technical or 
functional needs over time 
 
The extent to which technological development and 
processes make the project opportunity technically 
feasible 
 
 
 
 
Design, surveying, 
construction, drilling, 
tunneling 
 
 
B2. Architectural Constructs and Arrangements 
This category forms the intermediate layer between the Inherent Features and the final 
layer consisting of Emergent Properties. Architectural constructs and arrangements by which 
project architects shape and fix the form, organization, and logistical activities of the LIP. A 
higher level of detail and specification is observed as compared to the inherent features. 
 
Table B2. Architectural Constructs and Arrangements in the House of Project 
Complexity 
Category 
• Concept 
Definition Indicator / Example 
 
Architectural 
(Institutional) 
 
• Project 
Vision/Narrative 
 
 
 
• Public-private 
Interaction 
 
 
 
• Coalitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Roles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A deliberately crafted story that motivates the project 
opportunity and describes how the project concept will 
satisfy the social needs that justify the project 
opportunity 
 
The explicit, often contractual, arrangement of roles 
and division of responsibilities between identified 
institutional actors in the public and private sector who 
participate in the project solution (Grimsey & Lewis, 
2007) 
 
The subset of stakeholders that become aligned or to 
advocate their interests or specific agenda (SAGE 
Publications, 2009). Coalitions generally tend to either 
be supporting or opposing aspects of the project 
concept, and coalitions may evolve over time, i.e. their 
membership and position on the issues may change 
 
The set of rights and obligations, or expected behaviors 
that various stakeholders, who are now explicitly 
identified, are expected to perform in the project 
concept 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivated by economic 
development, reputation, or 
job creation 
 
 
Concessions, Build-Operate-
Transfer, Privatization 
 
 
 
 
Groups of firms/sponsors 
advocating a project 
 
 
 
 
 
Convening, financing, 
designing 
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• Financing & 
incentives 
 
 
 
• Coordination and 
logistics 
 
  
 
The structuring of financial flows, investment and 
contractual incentives in the project solution (Esty, 
2004a; Esty, 2004b) 
 
 
The protocol for communication and decision-making 
in the project solution 
 
  
 
 
Project finance, syndication, 
revenue collar 
 
 
 
Lean methods, concurrent 
design & engineering 
 
Architectural 
(Technical) 
 
• Design Lock-in 
 
 
 
 
 
• Colocation/separation 
 
 
 
• Scale/scope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Technology/process 
 
 
 
 
 
• Timing/pacing 
 
 
• Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
The detailed, irreversible specification of the 
technology paradigm, elements/components, and 
processes as a precursor to construction or final 
implementation 
 
 
The intentional choices regarding the geographical 
arrangement of technical processes and components 
(Browning, 2001; Joskow, 1988) 
 
The magnitude of production output/services 
envisioned in the project concept and associated tasks 
and activities that must be completed to enable the 
project (Project Management Institute, 2004; A. J. 
Shenhar, 2001) 
 
The basic technological paradigm that enables output in 
the project concept, and the mechanism by which the 
technology paradigm acts on material/information 
inputs to transform them to desired outputs 
 
 
The chronological sequencing of various design and 
logistical activities in the project solution (T. Williams, 
2005) 
 
Aspects of the design that support scaling, operation 
and maintenance of the technology and process 
(Eppinger & Browning, 2012; Sosa, Eppinger, & 
Rowles, 2003) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mine-mouth coal plant, 
collocated utility easements 
 
 
Sub-system, system, 
program/array 
 
 
 
 
Thermal power, rail 
transport, combined cycle, 
pulverized coal 
 
 
 
Fast track, concurrent 
 
 
 
Modular, integral 
 
B3. Emergent Project Properties/Ilities 
At the uppermost level of the HoPC structure, the ‘Ilities’ category contains concepts that 
broadly represent outcomes of the process of project architecting. The emergent properties are 
the result of the interdependence and interactions between various technical and institutional 
features of the project and the architectural constructs and arrangements used to mediate these 
features. ‘Ilities are defined as (de Weck et al, 2012): 
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The ilities are desired properties of systems, such as flexibility or maintainability (usually 
but not always ending in “ ility “), that often manifest themselves after a system has been put to 
its initial use. These properties are not the primary functional requirements of a system ’ s 
performance, but typically concern wider system impacts with respect to time and stakeholders 
than are embodied in those primary functional requirements. The ilities do not include factors 
that are always present, including size and weight (even if these are described using a word that 
ends in “ ility ” ).  
 The ‘ilities’ observed in our sample are defined in Table B3. 
 
Table B3. Emergent Properties/’Ilities’ in the House of Project Complexity 
Category 
 
Definition Indicator / Example 
 
‘Ilities’ 
 
• Quality 
 
 
 
 
• Flexibility 
 
 
 
 
• Profitability 
 
 
• Sequentiality 
 
 
 
 
• Survivability/Robustness 
 
 
 
 
• Difficulty 
 
 
• Consequentiality 
 
 
• Governability 
 
 
• Functionality 
 
• Non-linearity 
  
 
 
 
The ability to deliver requirements at a “high” level, 
as perceived by people relative to other alternatives 
that deliver the same requirements (De Weck et al., 
2011) 
 
The ability of a system to undergo classes of change 
with relative ease and efficiency, especially as new 
requirements, needs and possibilities emerge over 
time (de Weck et al., 2011) 
 
The ability to generate economic returns or value for 
various stakeholders 
 
The property of a chronologic sequencing of 
activities and events, such that earlier activities must 
be completed before later ones can be begun. 
 
 
The ability to persevere in existence, in spite of 
shocks or crises to the system, or changes in 
environment (de Weck et al., 2011) 
 
 
The property of being hard to accomplish 
 
The extent to which failure of a system results in the 
loss of economic, material and or reputational 
resources 
 
The ability to steer the system through turbulence in 
the institutional domain (Miller and Lessard, 2001) 
 
The ability to fulfill stated needs and requirements 
 
The property of a system that results in effects and 
impacts being disproportionate to the causes, either 
through amplification or attenuation 
 
 
